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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

CALVIN BUTTERFIELD,

:

Case No. 930212-CA

Priority No. 2

De f endant/Appe11ant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from convictions for escape, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1990)
and two counts of assault by a prisoner, third degree felonies,
in violation Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Did the trial court erroneously deny defendant's

motion in limine to exclude evidence of his parolee status in
violation of rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence?
This issue has not been preserved for review.

"Utah

Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires xa clear and definite objection'
at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for appeal."

State v.

Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814
(1989) . To preserve a particular objection to evidence for
appeal, a defendant must have specifically stated to the trial

court the same grounds for objection presented on appeal.

State

v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989); State v. Davis, 689
P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984).
B.

Did the court abuse its discretion in admitting

evidence of defendant's parolee status over his rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence, objection?
A trial court has broad discretion to decide whether
relevant evidence should be excluded under rule 403.

See State

v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992); State v. Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).

A trial court does not

commit reversible error in a 4 03 ruling unless it abuses its
discretion; that is, "as a matter of law, the trial court's
decision that 'the unfairly prejudicial potential of the evidence
outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was beyond
the limits of reasonability."

Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40

(alteration in original) (citation omitted).

See also State v.

O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 699 n.5 (Utah App.), cert, denied,

P.2d

(Utah July 6, 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with escape, a class B
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1990) and

2

two counts of assault by a prisoner, third degree felonies in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1990) (R. 16-18).
Following a two-day jury trial defendant was convicted
as charged (R. 104-06) .
The trial court sentenced defendant to a six-month term
in the Salt Lake County Jail for the misdemeanor count and two
terms of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison for the
felony counts, all terms to run concurrently (R. 142-44).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

Motion in Limine

Defendant filed a motion in limine requesting the trial
court to "exclude any evidence revealing [his] parolee status or
prior criminal history," on the grounds that the evidence was
more prejudicial than probative under rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence (R. 28-29) (attached as addendum A ) .

Specifically,

defendant requested that "no testimony be allowed to be
introduced by the State regarding specific conditions of [his]
parole status, i.e. that alcohol consumption constitutes a parole
violation [.]" (R. 29), see Addendum A.

Additionally, defendant

asked that officers from Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) and
from the Orange Street Correctional Facility be referred to only
as "law enforcement officers" (R. 28-29), see Addendum A.
Defendant further requested that the Orange Street Correctional
Facility be referred to only as a "custodial facility" (R. 28),
see Addendum A.

Finally, defendant requested that a videotape

3

made of his conduct while at Orange Street be excluded (R. 29),
see Addendum A.1
The parties stipulated that 1) defendant was on parole
at the time of his arrest; 2) he was arrested by AP&P agents; 3)
the assault occurred outside the Orange Street Correctional
Facility; and 4) the assault occurred while the officers were
engaged in the performance of their official duties (R. 168).
The parties further stipulated that while the fact of defendant's
drinking would be introduced, the fact that his drinking also
constituted a parole violation would not be introduced (R. 19394) .
In ruling on the motion in limine, the trial court
viewed defendant's requests concerning his parolee status as
resolved by the parties' stipulation to exclude the fact that
defendant's drinking constituted a parole violation (R. 199) (a
complete copy of the trial court's oral ruling is attached as
Addendum B).

The court then granted that part of defendant's

motion requesting that the involved AP&P and correctional
officers be referred to only as law enforcement or peace officers
(R. 198), see Addendum B.

The court also granted defendant's

request that the Orange Street Correctional Facility be referred
to only as a custodial facility (R. 198), see Addendum B.

1

During oral argument on the matter, defense counsel
also asserted that the evidence was not relevant under rule 4 01,
Utah Rules of Evidence, and cursorily argued that the evidence
was not admissible under rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence (R.
180). Additionally, defense counsel argued that the videotape
should be excluded under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
4

However, the court denied defendant's request to exclude the
videotape (R. 197-98), see Addendum B.
In response to defense counsel's request for
clarification of its ruling concerning the admissibility of
defendant's parolee status, the court explained that based solely
on the parties' stipulation, only the fact that defendant's
drinking constituted a parole violation would be excluded:

"I

granted that because it was the subject of a stipulation,

I'm

not sure that would have been my ruling" (R. 204), see Addendum
B.

The court further explained that other indicia of defendant's

parolee status was not at issue because it had not been
specifically listed in the motion in limine (R. 199), see
Addendum B.

Thus, the court ruled:

[D]efendant's parole status is a subject that
is relevant, and further, a subject that is
probative, and more probative than
prejudicial.

You have a person who is a prisoner, and you
charge that person with assault by a
prisoner. The prisoner's status is a key
element. In this case [defendant] is not
charged precisely with that, but the
underlying facts and circumstances are at
issue. He is a prisoner, and how he happens
to be prisoner is a matter of relevance.

[Defendant's] lawful arrest is predicated
part upon the fact that he was a parolee,
that's my finding. There would have been
other basis for arresting him. The basis
the arrest, as I understand it, . . . had
do with his parole status.

5
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There is no way around that. It is the fact.
And so, given the nature of the charges, the
totality of the facts and circumstances,
while it may be in some slight way
prejudicial, it certainly is probative of the
crime charged before the court.
(R. 204-06), see Addendum B.
B.

Motion for Mistrial

During jury selection, a potential juror (who was later
struck for cause) commented that he knew defendant, stating: "I
have worked a lot with the alcoholics and the people coming out
of jail" (Transcript of Jury Trial, February 16-17, 1993, T. 54) .
Defendant subsequently moved for a mistrial on the apparent
ground that other potential jurors overheard the comment (T. 78).
The trial court denied the motion, ruling as follows:
The fact that the defendant is a person
who has parole status is also something that
is clear and was not to be the subject of any
kind of limitation. Additionally, the fact
that he is a person convicted is something
that is going to come out.
The nature of the allegations before
the Court, the fact that he was a person
under arrest, a person assaulting a peace
officer, is not a matter that is secret. If
this were a case in which the defendant were
not a person who, by virtue of the
allegations, had a status that was related to
incarceration in some way, then I would be
inclined to look more seriously at the motion
for a mistrial.
But given the nature of the allegations,
the brief references by prospective juror
number four, the unclear nature of those
references vis-a-vis the defendant, and the
fact that they are not particularly
prejudicial in any respect, I am going to
deny the motion for a mistrial.

6

(T. 82) (a complete copy of defense counsel's motion and the
court's ruling is attached as Addendum C).
C.

Jury Trial

A two day jury trial was held on February 16-17, 1993
wherein the following evidence was adduced.
On the evening of September 4, 1992, AP&P Officers Brad
Bassi and Swen Heinberg investigated the report of a domestic
disturbance involving defendant and his wife (T. 107, 174).
In the course of their investigation the officers smelled alcohol
on defendant's breath and noted his agitated emotional state (T.
113-14) . The officers believed the dispute could be resolved
peacefully if they "remove[d]" defendant "from what was obviously
a volatile situation [.]" (T. 175). After the officers tried
unsuccessfully to contact defendant's relatives, they decided the
next best course was to take defendant to a nearby custodial
facility (T. 175-76).

However, the facility refused to take

defendant because he refused to comply with their regulations (T.
176).

Consequently, the officers arrested defendant for a parole

violation and attempted to transport him to the Salt Lake County
Jail (T. 136, 177).
As defendant was being escorted from the custodial
facility, he escaped to a nearby field (T. 177-78).

Defendant

was apprehended after a short chase and the officers again
attempted to transport him to the county jail (T. 178). When the
officers attempted to sit defendant in the rear passenger area of
their vehicle, defendant laid on his back and began kicking
7

rapidly (T. 179). Officer Bassi estimated that defendant kicked
him 2 0-30 times from a distance of approximately one to two feet
(T. 126). Defendant also grabbed hold of Officer Bassi's right
arm and "twisted" it behind his (Officer Bassi's) back (T. 12425, 181). Officer Heinberg estimated that defendant kicked him
approximately two to three times (R. 180). Additionally,
defendant spit at and attempted to bite Officer Heinberg (T. 124,
179, 181). "[Defendant] was turning his head to the left and
trying to bite.

. . . [Officer Heinberg's] ear or his face,

[and] snapping at him" (T. 124).
At this point, the officers requested backup from the
custodial facility (T. 181). Two officers responded and helped
to subdue defendant (T. 182). Because the officers' vehicle did
not have a protective cage, they called the Salt Lake City Police
Department for further assistance in transporting defendant to
the county jail (T. 83).
Officer Victoria Allred responded in her "cage" car (T.
244).

Defendant was secured in the "cage" car with a seat belt,

handcuffs, and a rope around his arms (T. 245). Officer Allred
was forced to pull over twice on the way to the jail because
defendant was "very verbally abusive and belligerent and
thrashing about, kicking, pounding his head on the windows and
the cage behind and making threats" (T. 245) . Defendant was also
"getting out of his seatbelt" and the other restraints (T. 246).

8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's admission of defendant's parolee
status was proper.

Defendant did not preserve for appeal his

impermissible character objection to the trial court's admission
of his parolee status. Nor has he argued that there are
"exceptional circumstances" justifying his waiver of the issue,
or that this Court should consider his argument under the plain
error doctrine.

Further, the alleged improper references to

defendant's parolee status, of which he complains on appeal, were
initiated by defense counsel in his opening statement.
error, if any, would constitute invited error.

Thus,

Finally,

defendant fails to show that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to exclude the evidence under rule 403,
Utah Rules of Evidence.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
DEFENDANT'S PAROLEE STATUS WAS ADMISSIBLE
Defendant claims the trial court erroneously allowed
evidence of his parolee status throughout the two-day jury trial,
under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
5-6.

Br. of App. at 3-4,

Claiming his parolee status had no "'special relevance' to

any of the charges against him[,]fl defendant asserts his parole
status improperly, adversely reflected on his character.
App. at 6.

Further, defendant asserts the evidence was unfairly

prejudicial under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
at 6-7.

Br. of

Br. of App.

Insofar as it has been preserved for review, defendant's

challenge to the trial court's evidentiary ruling lacks merit.

9

A.

Waiver

"Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires xa clear and
definite objection" at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for
appeal."

State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).

To preserve a particular objection

to evidence for appeal, a defendant must have specifically stated
to the trial court the same grounds for objection presented on
appeal.

State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989); State

v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984).

Cf. State v. Archambeau,

820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991) ("Generally, a defendant who
fails to bring an issue before the trial court is barred from
asserting it initially on appeal.").
1.

Proceedings Below

In moving to exclude his parolee status below,
defendant's only articulated argument was his general assertion
that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial under rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence (R. 29, 180), see Addendum A.

During oral

argument, defense counsel also broadly asserted that defendant's
parolee status was not relevant under rule 4 01, Utah Rules of
Evidence and made cursory reference to rule 6 09, Utah Rules of
Evidence (R. 180).2
The trial court denied defendant's request to exclude
his parolee status, finding that defendant's "lawful arrest was
2

Although defense counsel additionally raised a rule
404(b) challenge during oral argument, that challenge was focused
exclusively on the admissibility of a videotape made of
defendant's conduct while at the Orange Street facility (R. 18687). That videotape is not at issue on this appeal.
10

predicated in part upon the fact that he was a parolee" (R. 206) ,
see Addendum B.

Thus, the court ruled defendant's parolee status

was both relevant and probative (R. 204-405), see Addendum B.
Although the court found defendant's parolee status admissible,
the court granted defendant's motion requesting that defendant's
parole agents be referred to solely as peace and/or law
enforcement officers (R. 198), see Addendum B.

The Court further

granted defendant's motion that the Orange Street Correctional
Facility be referred to solely as a "custodial facility" Id.
During jury selection, a potential juror (who was later
struck for cause) commented that he knew defendant, stating: "I
have worked a lot with the alcoholics and the people coming out
of jail" (T. 54). Defendant subsequently moved for a mistrial,
on the apparent ground that the comment may have been overheard
by other potential jurors (T. 78), see Addendum C.

The court

denied the motion, reiterating that defendant's "parole status
[was] clear and was not to be the subject of any kind of
limitation" (T. 82), see Addendum C.
Notwithstanding the court's ruling granting defendant's
request that his parole agents be referred to solely as law
enforcement and/or peace officers, defense counsel referred to
defendant's parole agents as "parole officers" in his opening
statement to the jury (T. 103). Additionally, defense counsel
variously referred to the officers as "parole agents," a "parole
agent supervisor" and "agents" throughout the trial (T. 103, 111,
135-36, 148, 222). When the State's witnesses subsequently made
11

reference to defendant's status as a "parolee[]," (T. 171), and
"prisoner for AP&P," (T. 244), no objection was made.
2• Failure to Preserve Impermissible
Character Challenge
For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that
the trial court's ruling admitting his parolee status violated
rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.

Br. of App. at 5.

Because

defendant adequately raised only relevance and prejudice
objections to the evidence below, his 404(b) challenge has not
been properly preserved for review.

See State v. Larsen, 828

P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App.) (general allegation of prejudice below
held insufficient to preserve appellate argument that evidence
should have been excluded as impermissible character evidence
under rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence), cert, denied, 836 P.2d
1383 (Utah 1992).

See also Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 34-35; Van

Matre, 777 P.2d at 462; Davis, 689 P.2d at 14. The record does
not indicate any reason for defendant's failure to so challenge
the evidence in the trial court.

Cf. State v. Price, 827 P.2d

247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992) (absent special justification for
failing to present all available grounds in support of a
suppression motion, this Court will not rule on those grounds not
addressed in the trial court).
Moreover, defendant has not argued that there are
"exceptional circumstances" justifying his waiver of the issue,
or that this Court should consider his argument under the plain
error doctrine.
at 925.

Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 35; Archambeau, 820 P.2d

Finally, the alleged improper references to defendant's
12

parolee status, of which he complains on appeal, were initiated
by defense counsel in his opening statement and throughout the
two day trial (T. 103, 111, 135-36, 141, 148, 222). Accordingly,
any error was invited.

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1219 (Utah

1993) ("a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at
trial when that party led the trial court into committing the
error).

The Court should deem defendant's rule 404(b) objection

to the evidence waived.
B.

Defendant's Parolee Status Was Probative

Defendant fails to show the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his rule 403 objection to the admission of
his parolee status.3 A trial court has broad discretion to
decide whether relevant evidence would be excluded under rule
403.

See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992);

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).

A trial

court does not commit reversible error in a rule 403 ruling
unless it abuses its discretion; that is, "as a matter of law,
the trial court's decision that %the unfairly prejudicial
potential of the evidence outweighs [or does not outweigh] its
probativeness' was beyond the limits of reasonability."
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).

See also State v. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694, 699 n.5 (Utah

App.), cert, denied,

P.2d

(Utah July 6, 1993).

3

Although defendant arguably articulated rule 401, and
rule 609 objections to the admission of his parolee status below,
he has not raised those challenges on appeal. Thus, the State's
response is limited to addressing the admissibility of
defendant's parolee status under rule 403.
13

Defendant makes no effort to demonstrate that the trial
court acted unreasonably in not excluding evidence of his parolee
status under rule 4 03.

See Br. of App. at 6-7. Rather, the

reasonableness of the ruling is manifest by the court's
willingness to restrict the parties references to defendant's
parole agents, and to the correctional facility, in order to
dilute prejudicial effect.4
reasonable.
136).

In short, the court's ruling was

Defendant was arrested for a parole violation (R.

Accordingly, the court properly ruled that the basis of

defendant's arrest was both relevant and probative to the charged
offenses:

escape and assault by a prisoner (R. 201-206), see

Addendum B.

Cf. State v. Lancaster. 765 P.2d 872 (Utah 1988)

(permissible to introduce evidence of defendant's prior
conviction in order to prove an element of the offense for which
he was on trial); State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 481 ("[E]vidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is admissible where those
other crimes are so linked with the crime charged in point of
time and circumstances that one cannot be shown without proving
the other.").

4

As noted in part (A)(1), infra, it was defense counsel
who initially breached the court's ruling, referring to the
officers variously as "parole officers," "parole agents," and a
"parole agent supervisor" (R. 103, 135-36).
14

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should
uphold the trial court's ruling affirm defendant's convictions
for escape and assault by a prisoner,

A,

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this >S

day of November, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

AN DECKEI
sistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, attorney for
appellant, 424 J3ast 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this S

day of November, 1993.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

DAVID P. S. MACK, #4370
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:

MOTION IN LIMINE

:

vs.

:

CALVIN BUTTERFIELD,

:

Defendant.

:

Case No.921901678FS
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS

Defendant, CALVIN BUTTERFIELD, by and through counsel of
record, DAVID P. S. MACK, moves this Court for an order prohibiting
the prosecution from introducing any evidence revealing Mr.
Butterfield's parolee status or prior criminal history on Septeinber
4, 1992, specifically:
1.

That Officers Bassi and Heimberg not be allowed to be

identified by themselves or others by use of the terms I.S.P.
agents, intensive supervised parole agents, Adult Parole and
Probation agents, AP&P agents, probation officers/agents, parole
officers/agents etc. but only as law enforcement officers;
2.

That Orange Street Community Correctional Center be

referred to by the prosecution and any prosecution witnesses only as
a

,f

custodial facility" and not as Orange Street C.C.C., Orange

Street, half-way house, etc.;

00028

3.

That Officers Cole and DeLand not be allowed to be

identified by themselves or others by use of the terms Corrections
Officers, Orange Street C.C.C. officers, etc. but only as law
enforcement officers;
4.

That no testimony be allowed to be introduced by the .
^Jc^

State regarding specific conditions of Mr. Butterfield's parole
status, i.e. that alcohol consumption constitutes a parole
violation, etc.;
5.

That the video tape made at Orange Street C.C.C. on

v

September 4, 1992 depicting Mr. Butterfield not be allowed to be ^"-^-W^
;+\ L

referred to or introduced by the prosecution or any prosecution
witnesses.

r

Defendant makes this motion on the grounds that the

^/*^^'

evidence sought to be excluded is irrelevant and not probative of

*UT~

the charges alleged in the information or, if relevant, is violative
of Rule 403, U.R.E., in that any probative value is outweighed by
prejudice to Mr. Butterfield.
DATED this

day of December, 1992.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

DAVID P. S. MACK
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this

"M

day of December, 1992.
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ADDENDUM B

1

Again, I think, you know, we can narrow this and

2

put it in a vacuum and eliminate a lot of the extraneous

3

stuff that I think is prejudicial and reversible,

4

J possibly, and you know it's a very simple case.

5 I talking about alleged assaults, here.
6

they didn't.

They happened or

He was a prisoner or not, and they were

7

I peace officers or not.

8

J beyond that.

9

We're

THE COURT:

And I don't know we need to go

Let me ask you this, just to be

10 I clear on the video tape issue. Are you suggesting at this
11

point in time that if we utilize the entire video tape,

12

which you believe to be less prejudicial, as I understand

13

it, because it's contextual, that is to say the whole

14

thing is put in context, are you saying that then you have

15

no objection to its utilization?

16

MR. MACK:

Well, I would still prefer not to

17

have it.

18

extremely relevant.

19

can be testified to by the witnesses he intends to call.

20

I think it's cumulative, and I think it's not
I think that whatever went on there

If you're going to let any of it, I guess I

21 I would reserve that and like to view it one more time, but
22

I think I would rather have the whole thing shown than

23

I just the part that best fits the prosecution's theory.

24

I

25

THE COURT:

Let me say this. This is predicated

upon your having another opportunity to look at it, this
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1

is predicated upon testimony establishing that it was near

2

I in time and closely related to the episode in question in

3

J terms of geography and temporal proximity, and if I

4

J assume, based upon that, that I'm going to let it in, I

5

I want to be clear that one of the subjects of voir dire

6

with this jury panel is going to have to be whether they

7

be offended by seeing, albeit from a distance, you know,

8
9
10

I part of a nude male body.

Because I think that's an issue

we need to deal with.
Now, I'll be candid with you.

The placement of

11

the video camera, the placement of the police officers in

12

relation to the defendant and the video camera, really, to

13

my mind, removes any real sensational aspect, but I want

14

to be clear that that's one of the things I think we need

15

to be cognizant of.

16

MR. MACK:

With regard to if it's used—

Well,

17

so you're saying that maybe a voir dire question, and then

18

I the decision to whether to view it or not will come later.

19

THE COURT:

I'm saying that at this point in

20

time, if I allow the video, in response to your objection,

21

it would be the total video, not just the last portion.

22

But secondly, my perception is the video tape is relevant,

23

I Secondly, I do not believe at this point in time, if the

24

video is temporally proximate, and consistent, with what

25

Mr. Updegrove has related by way of proffer, in relation
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1
2
3
4

I to the event can be established, I'm inclined to let it
in, finding that it is not unduly prejudicial, and that it
I is probative.

understand the evidence to be.

5
6
7

So certainly you can renew your motion, and I
J obviously am not going to make a final determination until
I have heard the testimony that will precede its

8

I admission.

9

in time.

10

I do not find it cumulative of what I

But that's the way I'm heading at this point

As to issue number 1, I'm going to rule that

11

officers Bassey and Heinberg are to be referred to only as

12

peace officers or law enforcement officers.

13

going to order that, or rule, I should say, that the

14

Orange Street Community Correctional Center be referred to

15

as a custodial facility, so in that sense I'm granting the

16

motion in limine as to 1 and 2.

17

Further, I'm

In large part, because of the ruling, as Mr.

18

Mack has pointed out in connection with the motion to

19

dismiss, that puts it in consistency, or conformity with

20

the pleading and the information.

21

And also, as to point 3, that officers Cole and

22

DeLand be allowed to be identified by themselves or others

23

by the use of the term "correctional officers," that

24

I provision, they are to be referred to, again, as peace

25 I officers or law enforcement officers. My understanding is
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1

I that that is consistent with the information.

Although

2

not as specifically correct, I think it is less

3

J prejudicial and fairer to the defendant, and still

4

J provides the jury with the information they need in order

5

J to make an informed determination.

6

J

Section 4 in the motion in limine, and section

7

5, I have already discussed.

8

of a stipulation, and 5, I believe I have fully covered on

9

the record.

10

MR. MACK:

4 is essentially the subject

Just to clarify, then, Your Honor, in

11

covering things that I didn't specifically outline.

12

other references that would indicate Mr. Butterfield's

13

parolee status, specifically curfew, prerevocation

14

hearing, any references like that, we would ask that those

15

also b e —

16

THE COURT:

17 I motion.

But

That's not specifically part of the

The parolee's status, I don't see, as being part

18

of the motion, and I have not yet addressed that.

19

let's talk about that.

20

officers' designation, or the correctional officers, and

21

to Orange Street.

22

upon the way the information has been couched, and also

23

the fact that alluding to Orange Street as a community

24

So

I am referring to the police

And my rulings have been largely based

I correctional center does not seem to add anything, and may

25 I be prejudicial.
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1

But the issue of parole status, I'm not

2

convinced that that is in the same, that that's the same

3

issue.

4

1

MR, MACK:

Your Honor, I misunderstood, then,

5

thought you ruled to that part of number 4—I listed one

6

example, there—which had to do with alcohol.

7

main point there was anything regarding—

8

I status as a parolee.

9

J

THE COURT:

But the

Well, his

Well, 4 says no testimony be allowed

10

to be introduced by the state regarding specific

11

conditions of Mr. Butterfield's parole status, i.e.

12

alcohol consumption.

13

Let me ask you this, Mr. Updegrove.

14

intend to attempt to introduce any other aspects of his

15

parole status?

16

J

MR. UPDEGROVE:

Do you

No aspects of his parole status,

17

Your Honor.

18

a law enforcement or peace officer, why they took him to

19

the custodial facility, and it would be he was, they were

20

charged with looking into this matter for a possible

21

parole violation.

22

I

I was going to ask the, whether it be called

I mean, how can I get around that?

THE COURT:
MR. MACK:

How can you get around it, Mr. Mack?

23

J

Well, back to his theory where they

24

J were trying to be the nice officers, that was a step short

25

I of jail.

They were taking him there to get the parties
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1

separated from this domestic dispute.

2

I

3

I it's part of their basis for detaining him and taking him

4

I into custody.

5

I would not have treated him in this same manner.

6

THE COURT: Well, the bottom line, though, is

MR. MACK:
prejudicial.

9
10

So it

seems to me that it is clearly relevant, isn't it?

7
8

Had he been a citizen on the street they

Well, if it is, it's, I think,

I think we can—

THE COURT: The facts are the facts, are they
not?

11

MR. MACK:

But we can talk about it, he wasn't

12 J there, he wasn't there because it's Orange Street.
13

there because that's a place they could take him.

14

tried to make phone calls there.

15

to leave him there.

16

He was
They

They weren't even going

THE COURT: Well, I've ruled with you on the

17

Orange Street aspect.

18

talking about is the term "parolee," is the utilization of

19

the term "parolee." And I frankly, you tell me where I'm

20 J wrong.

Now what I understand us to be

I don't see how we can talk fairly about the facts

21

of this case without alluding to that.

22

and that is one of the underlying precepts of the arrest,

23
24
25

I or the detention.
MR. MACK:

He was a parolee,

Is it not?
Well, according to the officers'

first statement, he was arrested for public intoxication.
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1

I They can take him, I assume that a peace officer could

2

take him to any facility, any location, within reason.

3

don't know that his status as a parolee adds anything to

4

J that.

I

I mean it's true he is a parolee, but they were

5

exploring other options. They might or might not arrest

6

him at that point for those charges. They were maybe or

7

J maybe not going to take him to jail.

8
9

But I think if we're not calling Orange Street
J by its name, I think it's the same reason for not calling

10

attention to his parole status.

11

The charges that he's facing—

12

THE COURT:

The distinction, as I see it, Mr.

13

Mack—and excuse me for interrupting—is that he was not

14

in the Orange Street facility as an inmate or a resident,

15

as I understand it.

16

MR. MACK:

17 J

THE COURT:

Right.
So in my opinion, to allow

18

utilization of the term "correctional institution" in

19

connection with Orange Street gives a significance to that

20

institution in the context of these facts that's

21

inaccurate.

22

J favor on that.

23

That's the reason that I am ruling in your
I don't want in any way to provide facts

to the jury that are inaccurate.

24

I

I think what we're all about here is making sure

25

I that the defendant gets a fair trial. And to the extent
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1

I that that is unfairly reflective of the facts, I want to

2

I minimize the usage of that term.

3
4
5
6

MR. UPDEGROVE:

Mr. Updegrove?

Yes, Your Honor.

I comes out, the two agents, Bassey and Heinberg, took him
to Orange Street, they were initially going to put him in
I Orange Street for overnight to see if he'd calm down,

7

sober up and that sort of thing.

8

take him to the jail and to the prison.

9

As the case

They did not want to
And when he

J started acting up, as you saw in the tape, Orange Street

10

J refused to take him.

11

J jail, and the assault happened on the way to jail.

12

And then they had to take him to

The average citizen's not taken to some facility

13

to be put in overnight to sleep it off and go back out on

14

the street.

15

send him to prison.

16

It's very relevant that they didn't want to

THE COURT: Is there any case law, Mr. Mack, to

17

support your position that the utilization of the term

18

"parolee" in this context is reversible error?

19
20
21

MR. MACK:

I don't have any directly on point,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

It is the fact, is it not?

And it

22

I seems to be a relevant fact, in view of the totality of

23

I facts and circumstances, as I see it.

24
25

MR. MACK:

Well, then why are we doing—

You

I granted part of number 4 regarding the fact that alcohol
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consumption would constitute a parole violation.

If he's

on parole and that's a violation, why bring it in?
THE COURT:

I granted that because it was the

subject of a stipulation.

I'm not sure that would have

been my ruling.
MR. MACK:

Well, I just think where there's a

way to get through this without calling attention to his
status, which is prejudicial, I think, in the whole
case—and there's an easy way to do it.

I don't think

we're really putting one over on the jury—to say he was
taken here, he was separated from the combative situation,
here.

He had been drinking, they were calling his

brother.
The assaults took place afterwards, outside.
The way it's charged it doesn't matter if he was on parole
or not.

It doesn't require his parole status.
THE COURT:

It doesn't matter to the charging,

but it matters to the underlying circumstances and the
conduct of the officers and the conduct of the defendant.
I will allow you to renew this if you feel that
you have any new statutory or legal authority for your
position, or if the facts come out in a way different than
we all anticipate.
At this time my ruling is that the defendant's
parole status is a subject that is relevant, and further,
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a subject that is probative, and more probative than
prejudicial.

In fact, that's based upon what I understand

the facts to be at this time.
MR. MACK:

Your Honor, if I may ask, does your

ruling, do you feel, comport with 609 problems?

I mean

the question's going to be raised in the jury's mind,
"What crime did he commit?"

That wouldn't come in if he

testified, unless and if the state could prove that.

I

think that's just giving that to them, which I think is a
problem with 609.
THE COURT:

How do you get around the fact that

the man is on parole, counsel?
MR. MACK:

You just don't mention it.

THE COURT:
feasible.

You don't—

I don't think that that is even

You have a person who is a prisoner, and you

charge that person with assault by a prisoner.
prisoner's status is a key element.

The

In this case he is

not charged precisely with that, but the underlying facts
and circumstances are at issue.

He is a prisoner, and how

he happens to be a prisoner is a matter of relevance.
Again, I am willing to listen to anything
further you wish to provide to me in writing.

You can

argue it again prior to trial, the morning of trial.

But

at this point in time, unless there's something else,
that's my ruling•
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1

MR. MACK:

2 J Honor.

If I could make one statement, Your

His prisoner status is based on his being in

3

J c u s t o d y o f a p e a c e o f f i c e r p u r s u a n t t o a lawful arrest.

4

J

5

J p r e d i c a t e d in p a r t u p o n t h e fact that h e w a s a p a r o l e e ,

THE COURT: Right, and his lawful arrest is

6

and that's my finding.

7

I basis for arresting him.

8

I understand it, Mr. Updegrove, had to do with his parole

9

I status.

10

MR. UPDEGROVE:

11

THE COURT:

There would have been no other
The basis of the arrest, as I

That's correct, Your Honor.

There is no way around that.

It is

12

the fact. And so, given the nature of the charges, the

13

totality of the facts and circumstances, while it may be

14

in some slight way prejudicial, it certainly is probative

15

of the crime charged before the court.

16

anything supportive of your position in terms of statutory

17

authority, which, frankly, would stun me, given the nature

18

of the crime, I'd be happy to consider it.

19

come out differently than we expect in terms of what

20

motivated the officers, that I will also consider.

21

can certainly renew your motion.

22
23

So if you can find

If the facts

You

But at this point in time that's my ruling on
J both the video tape issue and the issue of the parolee

24
25 I

status. All right, thank you. We're in recess.
(Recess.)
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ADDENDUM C

struck one, four, eleven, nineteen, and twenty-two.

If

there is nothing further, do you both pass the jury for
cause in the condition it is presently in?
MR. UPDEGROVE:
MR. MACK:

The State does, your Honor.

Tour Honor, I am a bit concerned

about what Mr. Riley said in the presence of the
other jurors.

And I know that from our prior

discussions of our submitted voir dire with respect to
Mr. Butterfield's parole status I am not worried about
that.

But what he said, or what I wrote down that he

said, was he's dealt with alcoholics and people coming
out of jail.
I don't know if that's -- I mean -- you have asked
questions about alcohol use.

I do not know if alcoholic

is something stronger, that the rest of the jury might
be really wondering now.
his —

Particularly in light of

well, I don't think that there's any connection

really between his now being released, but I know
THE COURT:
MR. MACK:

—

What are you asking for, Mr. Mack?
I guess it would be a motion for

mistrial based on that.
THE COURT:
MR. MACK:
THE COURT:
MR. MACK:

Is that what you are asking for?
Yes.
You are asking for a mistrial?
Yes, your Honor.
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THE COURT:

Seriously asking for a mistrial?

Tou want to start from square one?
MR. MACK:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Tou believe that those comments

have prejudiced your client?
MR. MACK:

I don't know.

THE COURT:

—

Mr. Updegrove?

MR. UPDEGROVE:

Tour Honor, I don't think that

is a test of prejudicing the jury.
the jury has to —

I think

We have already

—

jury panel has to know by now that he

is a parolee, we're involved with a parole situation,
that he's been in some type of incarceration.

From the

questions concerning whether they drink, they have got
to have a feeling in their mind that Mr. Butterfield
drinks and there's probably something to do with the
assault -- or the charges to do with alcohol.
I don't see that just the term I have worked with
alcoholics —

he didn't say I worked with alcoholics

like Mr. Butterfield or I worked with that alcoholic.
just don't think that the panel has been quite
prejudiced.
THE COURT:

Are you able to go back to that

portion of the voir dire where that prospective juror,
Mr. Riley, addressed the issue of his acquaintance or
potential acquaintance?
19
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I

(Whereupon, the conversation was read back as
follows:
"MR. RILEY:

First could I ask a question?

I think I know this fellow."
•THE COURT:

Know what fellow?"

"MR. RILE7:

Right here.

Do I know you

Mr. — "
"THE COURT:

Are you referring, sir, to

another juror?"
"MR. RILET:

The fellow that's here in the

courtroom, that's on trial."
"THE COURT:

I see.

You believe you are

acquainted with the defendant, Mr.
Butterfield?"
"MR. RILET:

I have worked a lot with the

alcoholics and the people coming out of
jail."
"THE COURT:

All right, just a moment sir.

I am going to ask that you listen to me.
Do you believe you are acquainted with the
defendant?"
"MR. RILET:

I think I ran across him.")

(End of read back.)
THE COURT:

It will be my ruling that I do not

believe that in any way has this jury been impacted by

•0
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the few quick brief comments that prospective juror
number four made.

I am frankly surprised that a motion

for mistrial has been made, especially in view of the
fact that you did not even want Mr. Riley excused for
cause, counsel.
But I will indicate that in reviewing the record
with the court reporter, the only comments that were
made were:

I think I may know this fellow on trial.

I've worked with a lot of people, alcoholics and people
coming out of jail.
He does not specifically say that he knows the
defendant to be either an alcoholic or a person coming
out of jail.

We did not excuse him at that time point.

He will be excused for cause, but the rest of all of the
other challenges -- so he will not be set apart for the
rest of the jurors to understand that there may be some
particular acquaintance with the defendant.
In addition, this is the case where I was asked by
the defense, and based upon the defendant's request did
make inquiry of the jury as to whether or not they
consume alcohol and as to whether they could be fair to
a person who consumes alcohol.

So the issue of alcohol

has already been brought to the attention of the jurors
by virtue of the defendant's voir dire question, which I
asked in response to defendant's request.
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The fact that the defendant Is a person who has
parole status Is also something that Is clear and was
not to be the subject of any kind of limitation.
Additionally, the fact that he Is a person convicted Is
something that is going to come out.
The nature of the allegations before the Court, the
fact that he was a person under arrest, a person
assaulting a peace officer, Is not a matter that is
secret.

If this were a case in which the defendant were

charged with D.U.I, or the defendant were not a person
who, by virtue of the allegations, had a status that was
related to incarceration in some way, then I would be
inclined to look more seriously at the motion for a
mistrial.
But given the nature of the allegations, the brief
references by prospective juror number four, the unclear
nature of those references vis-a-vis the defendant, and
the fact that they are not particularly prejudicial in
any respect, I am going to deny the motion for a
mistrial.

Is there anything further at this point,

Mr • Updegrove ?
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:
MR. MACK:

Nothing, your Honor.

Anything further, Mr. Mack?
No, your Honor.

(End of conference in chambers.)
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